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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

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SENSITIVE

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SUBJECT: DDR IN DARFUR: A TANTALIZING POSSIBILITY FOR PEACE

¶11. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID is preparing its plan for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program in Darfur. With a budget of \$3 million USD for 18 months, UNAMID DDR staff will expand up to 30 officers and operate in all three Darfur states. UNAMID DDR will develop its plan in concert with the Government of Sudan (GOS), but DDR requires a ceasefire in Darfur before programs can begin. UNAMID will conduct DDR for combatants aligned with Darfuri rebel groups, but DDR for any combatants armed by the GOS, including the janjaweed, will remain the responsibility of the GOS. End summary.

¶12. (SBU) Despite the lack of an all-inclusive peace agreement in Darfur, UNAMID has recruited staff to develop a plan for DDR in Darfur, Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR) Henry Anyidoho told donors at a Sudan-wide DDR meeting hosted by UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi on May 28. "Combatants have been surrendering weapons at our team sites in Kebkabiya, Shagil Tobay and Nyala," Anyidoho said. "This is unexpected and we know that we need to prepare for DDR in Darfur." In coordination with UNDP in Khartoum, UNAMID will draw up the requirements for participation and engage with the Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) to build capacity for promoting DDR for all ex-combatants in Darfur. The Government of Sudan (GOS) has pushed UNAMID to develop a DDR strategy, and DJSR Anyidoho noted that while the NSDDRC lacks expertise or a comprehensive strategy to disarm Arab militia in Darfur, UNAMID remains hopeful that their budget projection for the initial stages of the project (approximately \$3 million USD for 18 months) is realistic enough to lay a durable foundation for DDR programming in Darfur.

¶13. (SBU) Meeting with poloff in El Fasher on June 3, Aderemi Adekoya and Istvan Papp said UNAMID's DDR office will expand to 30 international and local staff by the end of the year. UNAMID's approach will not mirror the programs currently underway in Southern Sudan or in Somalia, according to Adekoya, who recently transferred from Mogadishu after overseeing a \$5 million USD grant from the Department of State to speed the integration of Somali armed militias. UNAMID will not pay cash for weapons, but instead will spearhead a program to encourage armed actors to surrender their arms in exchange for participation in DDR programs. "Politics drive DDR, and not vice versa, so we must wait for a ceasefire and peace agreement to be in place before we proceed with DDR," Adeyoka added.

¶14. (SBU) UNAMID has not yet estimated the numbers of current or ex-combatants who would be eligible for DDR in Darfur, but Adekoya said that UNAMID DDR would only cover combatants aligned with Darfur rebel groups. The Government of Sudan would be responsible for disarming and demobilizing all armed actors it had previously armed and mobilized, including the notorious janjaweed, non-janjaweed Arab militia, and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). UNAMID would provide technical assistance to the GOS for such groups, and would assist in developing reintegration programs as well.

¶5. (SBU) Comment: DDR in Darfur remains a tantalizing possibility for peace. As Darfur's rebel movements disintegrate, and with all parties to the conflict suffering from conflict fatigue, the current climate in Darfur suggests that UNAMID's proposal is timely and appropriate. Although the U.S. is not a financial donor to the perpetually underfunded DDR effort in Sudan, the start of a successful program in Darfur could complement the work done by all parties to reduce the violence in Darfur. While we predict that the Khartoum regime would support DDR for the rebel movements, UNAMID's success in DDR will depend on the GOS's willingness to reign in its violent and ruinous Arab militia.

WHITEHEAD